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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict 
liability and under negligence. By deterrence, I refer to the effect of the threat of 
liability on the care exercised by potential injurers.’ More precisely, this paper 
takes litigation costs as given and examines the social desirability of the levels of 
care exercised under negligence and under strict liability.2 
The relationship of this paper to the existing literature examining the influence 
of litigation costs on incentives under a liability system can best be described by 
comparing its focus to two fairly recent papers.’ Shave11 (1982) examines whether 
plaintiffs bring suit when bringing suit is socially desirable in a regime in which 
litigation is costly. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) examine whether the level of 
liability is socially optimal in a regime in which litigation is costly. This paper 
examines whether the level of care is socially optimal in a regime in which litigation 
is costly. 
The major result presented in this paper is that strict liability leads to under- 
deterrence when litigation costs are taken into account. The intuition behind this 
conclusion is straightforward. Optimal deterrence requires that all external costs 
resulting from the injurer’s failure to take care be “internalized” to the injurer. 
But if litigation is costly, two types of external cost will not be internalized under 
strict liability: the litigation cost “imposed” on victims who choose to sue; and 
the losses suffered by victims who choose not to sue because the cost of litigating 
exceeds the anticipated damage award. 
The negligence rule also leads to underdeterrence when litigation costs are taken 
into account. Specifically, if agents have rational expectations and the jury is 
perfectly informed, then in equilibrium a negligence regime must underdeter. The 
I thank Steven Shave11 for many valuable discussions. 1 also thank Ian Ayres, Richard 
Craswell, John Donohue, Daniel Rubinfeld, Peter Siegelman, and an anonymous referee 
for helpful comments on this paper. I have benefited from the support of the Program in 
Law and Economics at Harvard Law School, which is itself supported by a grant from 
the John M. Olin Foundation. 
‘This paper does not discuss the level of care exercised by potential victims, nor does it 
address the activity levels of injurers or victims. 
*The socially optimal level of care is the level that minimizes the sum of expected accident 
losses, the cost of accident avoidance, and litigation costs. “Optimal deterrence” results 
when actors take care when and only when it is socially desirable. 
j0n the influence of litigation costs on incentives see, e.g., Ordover (1978), Ordover (1981), 
Shave11 (1982), Menell (1983), Kaplow (1986), Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld (1987), Po- 
linsky and Rubinfeld (1988). 
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reason for this was, for the most part, provided in Ordover (1978): if under 
negligence all injurers obey the due care standard, no one will have an incentive 
to sue because the expected award will be zero; and if no one will sue, no one 
has an incentive to take care. Thus, an equilibrium under negligence requires the 
presence of a subset of potential injurers who do not obey the due care standard. 
It is shown in this paper that this subset is made up of potential injurers for whom 
taking care is socially desirable; thus, negligence underdeters. 
Part A of section 2 of this paper presents the model. Part B of the same section 
presents the basic deterrence proposition under strict liability and discusses im- 
plications of the model for the literature on the social versus private incentives 
to bring suit.4 Part C discusses deterrence under negligence. 
2. THE MODEL 
A. Basic structure and assumptions 
All actors are assumed to be risk neutral. It is also assumed that victims (plaintiffs) 
are the only parties who suffer loss from an accident, that the risk of loss to 
victims can be reduced by the exercise of caution by potential injurers (potential 
defendants), and that it is costly for injurers to take care. 
Let p = the probability of loss if potential injurers do not take care, p > 0; and 
q = the probability of loss if injurers do take care, p > q > 0. Let v = the (dollar) 
loss suffered by an accident victim, v > 0. The variable v is assumed to be random, 
with distribution function H(v). Specifically, it is assumed that the potential injurer 
randomly experiences accidents with victims, each of whom is capable of realizing 
a specific dollar loss, and these losses are distributed over the population in 
accordance with the distribution function H.5 Thus, if the potential injurer takes 
care, the expected loss suffered by victims is qE(v); and if the injurer does not 
take care the expected loss is pE(v), where 




Let x = the cost to a potential injurer of taking care, where x > 0. The variable 
x is assumed to be random, with distribution function G(x). The value of x is 
unobservable to potential victims; however, it is observed by the injurer and is 
known to him before he commits an offense. Further, in a negligence regime in 
which jurors have perfect information, the value of x is, in effect, observed by 
the jury. The typical injurer will choose not to take care if the expected cost of 
taking care exceeds the expected cost of not doing so. Thus unless the injurer is 
required to pay damages for either committing an offense or failing to take care, 
precaution will not be exercised. 
I assume that victims can sue for no more than the value of their loss, v.’ Let 
= the litigation cost borne by a victim, c, > 0; and c, = the litigation cost 
Lrne by an injurer in defending himself against a claim, c, > 0. 
“See Shave11 (1982), Menell (1983), Kaplow (1986), Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld (1987). 
‘An alternative explanation is that the accident loss imposed on every victim is itself a 
random variable governed by H(v). 
6The assumption that victims generally can sue for no more than the loss from injury has 
a great deal of support. See McCormick (1935), p. 85. There are, of course, cases in which 
victims are awarded more than their losses (e.g., punitive damages, treble damages in 
antitrust). Conversely, there are examples in which suits are brought by the government 
but where victims are awarded damages (e.g., enforcement of the National Labor Relations 
Act). 
I. Basic Propositions 
In this section I consider 
strict liability. 
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B. Strict liability 
the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under 
Two basic assumptions determine the effect of litigation costs on deterrence. 
The first is that suit is brought when it is privately profitable, that is, when v > 
c,. Thus, once an accident has occurred, the probability that the victim will bring 
suit is 1 - H(c,). The second assumption is that a potential injurer will take care 
if, after observing x, the expected cost of doing so is less than the expected cost 
of not doing so. Under these assumptions, the injurer will take care, under strict 
liability, when 
x + 911 - H(c,)l[c, + WV/V > cv)l < P[I - H(cv)l[c, + EC+ > ~11, (2) 
where 
E(v/v > c,) = 
I 
r vdH(v)/[l - H(c,)]. (3) 
C” 
Note that E(vlv > c,) is the expectation of v given that v > cy. Thus, c, + E(v(v > 
c,) is the injurer’s expected liability given that the victim brings suit. Equivalently, 
(2) can be written 
x < (P - Ml - WcJlUDlv > cv) + ~1. 
Taking care is socially desirable if, after the realization of x, 
(4) 
PE(v) + p[I - Wcv)l(co + cv) > x + qE(v) + q[l - H(cv)l(c, + ~1. (3 
Note that (5) can be rewritten 
x < (P - q)E(v) + (P - s)Il - H(cv)l(co + ~1. (6) 
If private enforcement (that is, the bringing of suits by plaintiffs) causes some 
actors for whom (5) is not satisfied to take care, then such enforcement “over- 
deters.” Similarly, if there are actors, for whom (5) is satisfied, who do not take 
care, then there is an “underdeterrence” problem. Finally, “optimal deterrence” 
occurs when enforcement causes actors to take care if and only if (5) is satisfied. 
With this in mind, we can state the following: 
Proposition I: Strict liability underdeters. 
The proof relies on (4) and (6). Using (4) and (6), strict liability underdeters if 
and only if 
(P - q)E(v) + (P - q)[l - Wc,)l(c, + cv) 
> (p - q)[l - H(c,)l[E(+ > cv) + ~1, 
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or equivalently 
E(v) + 11 - H(cv)lcv > vdH. 




vdH + vdH, 
‘=” 
and the proposition follows. 
Thus, if the socially optimal level of care is the level that minimizes the sum 
of expected accident losses, accident avoidance costs, and litigation costs, a strict 
liability regime will always result in potential injurers, as a group, taking too little 
care relative to the social optimum. More precisely, there will be potential injurers 
for whom taking care is socially desirable who will not take care. The intuition 
behind this result is straightforward. In a regime in which litigation is costly, the 
social cost generated by the injurer’s failure to take care is the sum of the expected 
loss imposed on a victim and the litigation costs imposed on society. Only part 
of this social cost is internalized under strict liability: the expected loss imposed 
on a victim who will bring suit plus the litigation cost borne by the injurer. As a 
result, strict liability must underdeter. 
The intuition behind proposition 1 suggests a policy for achieving the socially 
optimal level of care under a strict liability regime. Optimal deterrence can be 
achieved by making the injurer pay, in the form of a tax added to the injurer’s 
litigation cost, the expected loss imposed on a non-suing victim, plus the victim’s 
litigation cost.’ This argument is stated in a more rigorous fashion in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2: Under strict liability, the socially optimal level of care is achieved 
by adding to the injurer’s expected litigation cost the victim’s expected litigation 
cost plus the expected loss suffered by non-suing victims. 
To prove proposition 2, let t be a tax that is added to the injurer’s cost of 
litigating. Given this, (p - q)[l - H(c,)]t is the marginal tax incurred by the 
potential injurer in failing to take care. Using (4) and (6), deterrence is optimal if 
and only if 
(p - q)v + (p - q)]l - Wcv)l(co + cv) 
= (P - q)]l 
The solution requires that t satisfy 
=” vdH + [l - H(c,)lc, = [ 
- H(c,)][E(v]v > c,) + c, + t]. 
1 - H(cv)lt, (7) 
where the term on the right-hand side of (7) is the expected tax, given that an 
‘1 use the word “tax” because I have in mind a fee that is collected by some agency of 
the state. Note that if the tax were paid over to the victim, as if it were an alteration in 
the level of damages, the victim would have greater incentive to sue. 
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accident has occurred. The terms on the left-hand side of (7) are, respectively, 
the expected loss imposed of non-suing victims and the expected cost to the victim 
of litigating, given that an accident has occurred. 
An alternative way of stating proposition 2 is suggested by rewriting (7) as 
follows: 
=” vdH/[l - H(c,)] + c, = t. 
Thus, optimal deterrence is achieved by making the injurer pay a tax, in addition 
to the cost of the injurer of litigating, that is equal to the sum of two terms: the 
expected loss of non-suing victims, divided by the probability that suit will be 
brought, and the victim’s litigation cost. 
This unambiguously upward adjustment in the injurer’s liability should be com- 
pared with Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988), which suggests that the optimal ad- 
justment to compensatory damages might be positive or negative. The conclusion 
differs here largely because this paper examines a different question. The Polinsky 
and Rubinfeld paper determines the level of damages, to be paid to the victim, 
that minimizes the sum of expected accident losses, avoidance costs, and expected 
litigation costs. This paper, in proposition 2, determines the level of liability that 
causes the injurer to exercise the socially optimal level of care. The key difference 
between the approaches is that the adjustment to damages is a tax that is not 
transferred to the victim in this model, while the adjustment becomes part of the 
victim’s award in the Polinsky and Rubinfeld paper. In addition, in the Polinsky 
and Rubinfeld paper, the injurer is able to preclude suit by exercising a level of 
care that makes it unprofitable for the victim to bring suit. The injurer cannot do 
this in this model because the decision to sue itself depends on a random event: 
whether the victim’s loss exceeds the cost of litigating.* 
2. Implications of the Model for the Literature on the Social 
Desirability of Suit 
The treatment of the typical victim’s loss as random, which this paper adds to 
the basic model developed in Shave11 (1982), has interesting implications for the 
literature on the social desirability of suit.9 Nothing in the model disturbs Shavell’s 
point that social and private incentives to bring suit differ. To see this, note that 
in the model presented here, suit is socially desirable, that is, suit should not be 
prohibited, if 
pE(v) > g,@,(x) + 911 - H(cv)l(c, + G) + qW)I 
+ (1 - g,){p[l - Wcv)l(c, + G) + PW)I, 
where g, is the probability that a potential injurer will take care under strict liability 
(in order to reduce expected liability),‘O and is given by 
/ 
(p-q)l1-H(c,)l[E(vlv>~~)+c,l 
& = dW4, 
0 
&I examine the implications of this model for the optimal level of damages in Appendix B. 
yShavell (1982), Menell (1983), Kaplow (1986), Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld (1987). 
loNote that this is the probability that the cost of taking care, x, satisfies (4). 
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and E,(x) is the expectation of x given that the potential injurer takes care under 






Thus, suit is socially desirable if 
g&p - W(v) - Es(x)1 > kq + (1 - gs)pHl - Wcv)l(co + cdr 
which requires that the expected net gain from taking care exceeds the expected 
litigation costs imposed on society. The confirmation of Shavell’s result concern- 
ing the divergence between social and private incentives to sue is completed by 
noting that the social desirability condition is not the same as the plaintiff’s 
incentive condition v > c,. 
Although Shavell’s incentive divergence theorem remains valid in the mode1 
presented here, treating the typical victim’s loss as random does disturb some of 
the results presented in the Menell, Kaplow, and Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld 
papers. For in the models discussed in these papers, the injurer’s expected liability 
(damages plus the cost of litigating) increases discontinuously at the point where 
the victim’s loss is equal to the victim’s cost of litigating. No such discontinuity 
is observed in a model in which the typical victim’s loss (which is his anticipated 
recovery from bringing suit) is random. Without this discontinuity the injurer’s 
cost-benefit analysis no longer includes the option of precluding suit altogether 
by exercising a level of care that makes it unprofitable for the victim to bring suit. 
Moreover, under the assumption that the typical victim’s loss is random one can 
show that at the point of deciding the level of care, the injurer’s cost-benefit 
analysis is not the same as the social cost-benefit analysis. 
Because it involves a more elaborate model and the introduction of new no- 
tation, the implications of the model presented here for the Menell, Kaplow, and 
Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld papers are discussed in the appendix. The appendix 
presents a mode1 in which the injurer’s level of caution is a continuous variable 
that influences the amount of the victim’s damages. I demonstrate that proposi- 
tions 1 and 2 remain valid in the more general model.]’ 
C. Negligence 
Under negligence, suit is brought when WV > cV, where w = the probability that 
the jury will find the defendant negligent. Thus, in a negligence regime, the prob- 
ability that suit will be brought after an accident has occurred is 1 - H(c,/w). 
Under the “Hand Formu1a,“‘2 an actor is negligent if he fails to take care when 
(p - q)E(v) > x, which is the social desirability criterion for taking care when 
“Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld, on p. 488, show that, under the assumptions of their 
model, the injurer will produce more than the socially optimal level of output when lawsuits 
are permitted, provided that the injurer does not choose to produce at a level that precludes 
suit. 
I21 refer to the formula for negligence stated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 1.59 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The version presented in the text compares 
the marginal social cost of care to its expected marginal social benefit, ignoring litigation 
costs. 
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litigation is costless. I3 Any actor for whom (p - q)E(v) > x is “potentially neg- 
ligent,” in the sense that he will be held negligent if his failure to take care leads 
to an accident which is followed by a lawsuit. It is assumed that victims correctly 
perceive the probability of a negligence verdict, and thus are aware of the re- 
quirements of the Hand Formula. 
With perfect information, the jury will find the injurer negligent if, and only if, 
(p - q)E(v) > x is satisfied and the injurer did not take care. 
If the potential defendant could be judged negligent by a jury, because 
(p - q)E(v) > x, he will take care when 
x < p[l - H(c,/w)lE(vlv > c,/w) + (p - q)[l - H(c,/w)]c,, (9) 
where 
E(vlv > c,/w) = 
I 
sc vdH(v)/[l - H(c,/w)]. (10) 
CJW 
Since the jury has perfect information and actors correctly perceive the like- 
lihood of a negligence verdict, w is equal to the probability that the injurer is 
negligent (that is, potentially negligent and fails to take care), given that an accident 
has occurred. Using Bayes’ Theorem, that probability is expressed as follows:‘4 
w = p[g,q + (1 - g,)plP’ J(“Pq)E(‘) 
p[l-H(c,/w)lE(vlv:-c,/w)+(p~q)[l~H(c.iw)lc,, 
dG(xl (Ill 
where g, is the probability that a potential injurer will take care under negligence 
and is given by 
pll~H(c,lw)lE(vlv>-c,iw)+(p-q)[l -H(c,/w)lc, 
g” = dG(x). 
ISThis criterion minimizes the sum of expected accident losses and accident avoidance 
costs. Because it fails to take litigation costs into account, it is not the social desirability 
criterion for care in a world in which litigation is costly. However, because it is the 
traditional test for negligence it may be of interest to some whether actors will behave 
negligently, as defined by the Hand Formula, under a negligence regime or under strict 
liability. Whether actors behave negligently under a negligence regime is addressed briefly 
in this section of the text. The question whether actors behave negligently under strict 
liability is answered by the following result: 
Under strict liability, some potential injurers will act negligently if and only if 
/ 
I’ vdH > [I ~ H(c,)lc,,. 
0 
If the inequality is reversed, then some potential injurers will take care even though their 
failure to do so would not result in a negligence verdict. If the inequality is replaced 
with = then only those potential injurers who would be held negligent will take care. 
The proof of this statement mimics that for proposition 1. The statement requires a 
comparison of the defendant’s expected litigation cost to the expected loss suffered by 
non-suing victims. 
141f victims are rational, as assumed here, they will update their forecasts of the probability 
of a negligence verdict using the information that an accident has occurred. Thus, the 
rational forecast of the probability of a negligence verdict, given that an accident has 
occurred, will be greater than the probability that a potential injurer will act negligently. 
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An equilibrium value for the probability of a negligence verdict satisfies (11). 
Plaintiffs will bring suit only if the probability of a negligence verdict is positive. 
However, (11) clearly implies that w is positive, or equivalently plaintiffs will 
bring suit, if and only if 
(P - q)E(v) > p[l - HWw)lE(+ > c&l + (P - Ml - H(cJw)lc,. (12) 
But if (12) holds, then there will be potentially negligent injurers who fail to take 
care. 
This confirms the fundamental result of Ordover (1978) that equilibrium in a 
negligence regime requires the presence of a subset of actors who refuse to obey 
the due care standard. The reason is the following: if under negligence, all po- 
tentially negligent actors (those for whom (p - q)E(v) > x) take care, then no 
plaintiff will expect to win a lawsuit, so suit will not be brought. But if suit is not 
brought, no actor will have an incentive to take care. It follows that the rational 
expectations equilibrium under negligence is one in which there exists a group of 
injurers who are potentially negligent and fail to take care. 
Given an equilibrium within a negligence regime, taking care is socially desirable 
if, after the realization of x, 
pE(v) + p[l - H(c,/w)](c, + c,) > x + qE(v) + q[l - H(c,/w)l(c, + c,). (13) 
However, given that (12) holds in an equilibrium, the following condition must 
hold: 
(P - q)E(v) + (P - q)U - WcJw)l(c, + cv) 
> p[l - H(c,/w)]E(vlv > c,/w) + (p - q)[ 1 - H(c,/w)]c,. (14) 
Thus, 
Proposition 3: In equilibrium, negligence underdeters. 
In other words, in an equilibrium within a negligence regime in which litigation 
is costly, some injurers for whom taking care is socially desirable will not take 
care. The reason is that a plaintiff can expect to win an award in a negligence 
suit only if there exists a subset of potential injurers who fail to take care and 
whose cost of taking care is such that (p - q)E(v) > x. But if an injurer’s cost 
of taking care satisfies (p - q)E(v) > x, then the injurer is certainly one for whom 
taking care is socially desirable under the condition stated in (13). The presence 
of such an injurer implies that negligence underdeters. 
3. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict 
liability and under negligence. The primary result is that private enforcement 
under strict liability underdeters, in the sense that not every potential injurer for 
whom taking care is socially desirable will take care. In addition, if an equilibrium 
exists in a negligence regime, negligence also underdeters. This is a natural ex- 
tension of the result of Ordover (1978) that equilibrium in a negligence regime 
requires the existence of a subset of actors who fail to obey the due care standard. 
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APPENDIX A 
In this section I discuss the implications of the mode1 for the results presented in 
the Menell, Kaplow, and Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld papers. Adopting notation 
similar to that in the Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld paper, let 
z = injurer’s output, 0 I z < co; 
P(z) = gross profits of injurer, P’(0) > 0, pll 5 0; 
D(z) = gross damage to victim if an accident occurs, a random variable, 
D’ 2 0, D” 2 0. 
Also, assume that the probability of an accident = 1 
Proposition Al: Strict liability underdeters. 
Proof: The social optimum in output, z*, maximizes the function 
SB(z) = P(z) - Prob[D(z) > c,]{E[D(z)]D(z) > c,l + c, + c,] 
- Prob[D(z) < c,]E[D(z)lD(z) < c,]. 
The injurer’s net profit function, which is maximized at z**, is 
R(z) = P(z) - Prob[D(z) > c,]{E[D(z)lD(z) > c,] + c,}. 
This claim is proven by showing that SB’(z) < 0 at z**. If this is so, social welfare 
can be increased by the injurer producing less. Substituting in the first order 
condition for R(z), note that 
SB’(z**) = -{(dProb[D(z**) > c,]/dz)c, 
+ (dProb[D(z**) < c,]/dz)E[D(z**)ID(z**) < c,]} 
+ Prob[D(z**) < c,](dE[D(z**)(D(z**) < c,]/dz) 
Using the fact that dProb[D(z) > c,]/dz = -dProb[D(z) < c,]/dz, this can be 
rewritten 
SB’(z**) = -{(dProb[D(z**) > c,l/dz)(c, - E[D(z**)(D(z**) < c,]) 
+ Prob[D(z**) < c,l(dE[D(z**)(D(z**) < c,l/dz)} 
which is negative. 
Proposition A2: The optima1 level of care is achieved by adding to the injurer’s 
expected litigation cost the victim’s expected litigation cost plus the expected loss 
imposed on non-suing victims. 
Proof: The social optimum in care maximizes the function 
SB(z) = P(z) - Prob[D(z) > c,l{E[D(z)~D(z) > c,l + c, + c,] 
- Prob[D(z) < c,]E[D(z)(D(z) < c,l 
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Assuming that the injurer’s cost of litigating is increased by t, the injurer’s net 
profit function is 
R(z) = P(z) - Prob[D(z) > c,l{E[D(z)(D(z) > c,l + c, + t}. 
SB(z) and R(z) are equivalent if and only if 
Prob[D(z) > c,lt = Prob[D(z) > c,Ic, + Prob[D(z) < c,lE[D(z)lD(z) < c,] 
and the proposition follows. 
APPENDIX B 
In this section I examine the implications of the model presented in this paper 
for the optimal level of liability. Following Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988), let A = 
the adjustment to compensatory damages. Thus, under strict liability, the victim 
receives v + A if he sues the injurer. 
The optimal adjustment to compensatory damages, A, is chosen to maximize 
the net social benefit from private enforcement under strict liability, which is given 
by 













The derivative of NSB with respect to A is (suppressing the algebra) 
dNSB/dA = gs(p - q)[(co + c,)h + 1 - HI{@ - q)E(v) 
+ (p - q)(l - H)(c, + c,) 
- (p - q)(l - H)[E(vlv > c, - A) + A + c,l} 
- ksq + (1 - g&l(co + cvk (Bl) 
where H = H(c, - A) and h = H’. This simplifies to 
dNSBldA = gs(p - q)(p - q)[(co + c,)h + 1 - Hl[HE(v(v < c, - A) 
+ (I - H)(c, - A)1 - [gsq + (1 - gJpl(c, + c,)h. (B2) 
Suppose A = c,. Then h = H = 0, so that dNSB/dA simplifies to 
dNSB/dA = gs(p - q)(p - q)(cv - c,) = 0. 
Suppose A > c,. Then, again, h = H = 0, and the derivative simplifies to 
dNSB/dA = gs(p - q)(p - q>(cv - A) < 0. 
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Finally, suppose A < c,. Then the sign of the derivative is ambiguous, and 
depends on all of the factors summarized in the appendix of Polinsky and Rubinfeld 
(1988). Note that for A < c,, the first term in the derivative in (B2) is positive. 
This reflects deterrence benefits from increasing A: until A = c,, the injurer will 
exercise less than the socially optimal level of care. The second term in (B2) 
reflects the increase in litigation costs that results because with a higher level of 
liability more victims sue. For A < c, the relevant question is whether the benefits 
from increasing care exceed the increased litigation costs that result from more 
victim suits. 
Thus, as demonstrated in the Polinsky and Rubinfeld paper, the optimal ad- 
justment to compensatory damages is generally ambiguous, because it depends 
on such factors as the productivity of care (in this model, the size of the difference 
between p and q) and the total cost of litigation. If care is sufficiently productive, 
the derivative with respect to A of NSB(A) will be positive for A < c,; thus, the 
adjustment which maximizes social welfare will be A* = c,. However, if the 
derivative of NSB(A) is not positive for all A < cv (say, because care is not “very 
productive”), the optimal adjustment may be at some point A*, where A* < c,. 
One result that emerges is that the optimal adjustment to compensatory damages 
will never exceed cv, since net social benefit declines as A is increased above c,. 
The reason is that once A = c,, all victims will sue, so that all external losses are 
“internalized” to the injurer. Increasing A beyond this point has no effect on the 
rate at which victims sue (because all victims will sue when A = c,), but causes 
injurers to exercise care beyond the socially optimal level. 
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